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(1) 
SOMETHING TO (LEX LOCI) CELEBRATIONIS? 
MEG PENROSE* 
N June 26, 2013, the United States Supreme Court issued two 
opinions relating to same-sex marriage.1  In neither case did the Court 
issue the revolutionary decision granting a federal constitutional right to 
marriage.2  But, in the only case where the Court reached the merits of the 
same-sex marriage controversy, United States v. Windsor,3 an argument can be 
made that the Court planted the seeds for enshrining a future constitutional right 
to marriage based either on equal protection or substantive due process 
grounds.4  Actually, the better argument might be that Windsor is the 
germinated outgrowth of the Court’s previous jurisprudence relating to gay 
rights.5  Under Justice Scalia’s prediction—and, to be fair, he has accurately 
and presciently forecasted the trajectory of this issue6—full-fledged gay 
marriage is but a constitutional season or two away.7 
 
 *  Professor, Texas A&M University School of Law.  Professor Penrose teaches 
courses in Constitutional Law, Federal Criminal Procedure, Federal Civil Procedure, Gender 
Discrimination, and First Amendment.  Professor Penrose would like to thank her colleagues 
who improved this essay during a faculty speaker presentation at Texas A&M University 
School of Law in August, 2013.  Professor Penrose also recognizes the courageous same-sex 
couples whose legal marriages have brought this issue to the forefront.   
1.  See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
2.  The Court returned Perry to the lower court, essentially reinstating the federal 
district court’s opinion, based on the majority’s finding that the Court lacked standing.  It is 
noteworthy that both gay marriage cases provided lengthy discussions relating to standing and 
justiciability.  Avoiding the merits of such controversial and heated issues is not, however, 
foreign to the Court.  See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1974) 
(dismissing an educational affirmative action case on mootness grounds). 
3.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
4.  See id. at 2694 (noting that unions treated as second-class marriages for purposes of 
federal law raise “a most serious question under the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment”).  
Shortly thereafter, the Court notes that “DOMA writes inequality into the entire United States 
Code” and has the principal effect to “identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and 
make them unequal.”  Id. 
5.  The progression toward legalizing marriage, at the Supreme Court level, had 
previously begun first with overturning the criminality of intimate acts between consenting 
individuals.  See generally McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (overturning laws that 
prohibited intimate relations between interracial couples).  Then, once the underlying intimate 
act is found constitutionally protected, the larger relationship (marriage) is given 
constitutional protection.  See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down 
anti-miscegenation laws as unconstitutional).   
6.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Scalia predicted that Lawrence’s “reasoning leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting 
marriage to opposite-sex couples.”  Id. at 601.  Justice Scalia returned to the gay marriage 
issue a few pages later when he admonished, “[a]t the end of its opinion—after having laid 
waste the foundations of our rational-basis jurisprudence—the Court says that the present case 
‘does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship 
that homosexual persons seek to enter.’  Do not believe it.”  Id. at 604.   
7.  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (predicting that the second 
“state-law shoe” finding all same-sex marriage prohibitions unconstitutional will be “dropped 
O 
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Windsor holds Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, commonly 
referred to as DOMA, unconstitutional.  DOMA provided a federal definition of 
marriage as “a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and 
wife . . . .”8  After a long section regarding the prudential reasons to resolve the 
case, Justice Kennedy’s majority finds “that DOMA is unconstitutional as a 
deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution.”9  The majority conflates, however, the liberty component of the 
Fifth Amendment (which sounds of substantive due process) with the equal 
protection component of the Fifth Amendment by vacillating between liberty 
(substantive due process) and equality verbiage.10  The Court does not clearly 
use a heightened standard of constitutional review, such as intermediate 
scrutiny, which is usually applied to gender cases11 or strict scrutiny, which is 
reserved for suspect classes such as race or national origin.12  In fact, it is 
difficult to discern precisely what level of review the majority applies when it 
finds DOMA “invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and 
effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, 
sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”13 
This language sounds of “rational basis,” the lowest form of constitutional 
review and least searching level of constitutional scrutiny.14  Most laws 
evaluated under rational basis are easily found constitutional because all that is 
required is a legitimate governmental purpose.15  In fact, under traditional 
rational basis review, courts will generally provide aid and deference to the 
governmental entity seeking to uphold a particular law.16  If the governmental 
actor is unable to provide a rational basis for the legislative classification, courts 
using true rational basis review will conjure up hypothetical reasons that might 
suffice to uphold the law.17  The majority gives no such encouragement in 
Windsor. 
The other form of “rational basis” review, and the form that has been 
seemingly applied by the Supreme Court in the two gay rights cases is 
 
later, maybe next Term”). 
8.  1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000). 
9.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696.  
10.  See id.  The Court proclaims both that Windsor’s liberty and equality has been 
violated in three consecutive paragraphs.  One wonders whether such presentation is 
intentionally confusing or merely careless.  Constitutionally speaking, the presentation is 
undoubtedly lacking in precision. 
11.  See generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (seminal sex discrimination case 
establishing an intermediate, or “mid-tier,” level of constitutional scrutiny). 
12.  See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 218–27 (1995).  “[W]e hold 
today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government 
actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”  Id. at 227.  “In other 
words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that 
further compelling governmental interests.”  Id.  
13.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696.  
14.  See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955). 
15.  See id. at 488 (“It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it 
might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”).  
16.  See id. at 487. 
17.  See id. 
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something scholars call “rational basis plus” review.  This standard of review 
tolerates legislative classifications, unless the classification is based on animus 
or a desire to cause harm to an unpopular group.18  Perhaps Justice Kennedy is 
simply expanding his past writings in Romer v. Evans19 and Lawrence v. 
Texas20 where the focus was on animus toward same-sex couples rather than 
clear application of a traditional standard of constitutional review.21  
Throughout Windsor’s majority opinion, the Court speaks of “[t]he avowed 
purpose and practical effect of [DOMA which] are to impose a disadvantage, a 
separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages 
made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the [individual] States.”22 
Other rhetoric in the majority opinion condemns the “interference with the 
equal dignity of same-sex marriages”23 and the principle purpose of DOMA “to 
impose inequality”24 without valid reason.  Such phrasings indicate the 
majority’s disapproval of the federal government’s attempt to provide tiered 
approaches toward marriage, one for “traditional” opposite-sex marriage and 
one for same-sex marriage.25  So, does Windsor follow past precedence in 
giving special “rational basis plus” evaluation to same-sex issues or is the Court 
simply being obtuse?  Reading the majority opinion does not provide an answer. 
Perhaps Windsor is simply another step in the long march toward marriage 
equality.  What began in Romer was most assuredly expanded in Lawrence and 
set the stage for Windsor and beyond.  If Justice O’Connor’s legacy is as the 
Supreme Court’s “swing vote,” Justice Kennedy’s is quickly becoming that of 
the “gay rights” Justice.  In all three cases where the Court has extended 
protections to members of the gay community, Justice Kennedy has written the 
majority opinion.26  In each case, however, Justice Kennedy has advanced the 
right as narrowly as possible, always indicating that the Court is not yet ready to 
constitutionalize a federal right to same-sex marriage27 as previously occurred 
 
18.  See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
19.  517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
20.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
21.  See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Romer 
indicates that the Colorado Amendment struck down was constitutionally deficient for at least 
two reasons: 
First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and 
undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional and, as we shall 
explain, invalid form of legislation.  Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous 
with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything 
but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate 
state interests. 
Id. 
22.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).  
23.  See id.  
24.  See id. at 2694. 
25.  See id. at 2693–94. 
26.  See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996).  
27.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.  In distinguishing Lawrence from Bowers v. 
Hardwick, the case directly overruled by Lawrence, Justice Kennedy clearly indicates what 
the case is not about: 
The present case does not involve minors.  It does not involve persons who might 
3
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for interracial couples in Loving v. Virginia.28  Justice Scalia and other 
observers have been quick to criticize Justice Kennedy for his lack of clarity, if 
not fidelity, to constitutional review and applications of constitutional levels of 
scrutiny in each of these three cases.29 
Rather than enter the debate as to Justice Kennedy’s draftsmanship in the 
gay rights opinions, I would like to simply observe that Windsor leaves a 
pivotal question unanswered.  This question merits immediate attention and will 
undoubtedly serve as the next vehicle for advancing same-sex marriage.  While 
Windsor clearly extends federal marital benefits (and burdens)30 to persons 
whose marriage is lawful both within the lex loci celebrationis31 and the lex 
loci domicilii,32 Windsor actively sidesteps the follow-up and equally important 
question of whether federal marital benefits (and burdens) extend to all persons 
married, but not domiciled, in a state where same-sex marriage is lawfully 
recognized. 
The next “big” question regarding same-sex marriage will be whether 
marriages that are performed in a state permitting same-sex marriage but where 
the spouses then return, or move, to a state that does not permit, much less 
sanction, same-sex marriage, qualify for federal marriage benefits.  This 
scenario can occur in one of two ways: first, you can have a couple that travels 
to a location for a “destination wedding” to intentionally avoid their home 
state’s marriage laws,33 or, second, you can have a couple that was originally 
domiciled and married in a state permitting same-sex marriage, only later to 
 
be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not 
be easily refused.  It does not involve public conduct or prostitution.  It does not 
involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship 
that homosexual persons seek to enter. 
Id.  Justice Kennedy’s cautious approach was echoed in Justice O’Connor’s concurring 
opinion.  See id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
28.  388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
29.  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing “rootless and 
shifting” nature of majority’s justifications for its holding in Windsor).  “The sum of all the 
Court’s nonspecific hand-waving is that this law is invalid (maybe on equal-protection 
grounds, maybe on substantive-due-process grounds, and perhaps with some amorphous 
federalism component playing a role.”  Id. at 2707.  The majority opinion notes the criminal 
law protections, bankruptcy, taxes, health care, and ethics issues that lawfully married same-
sex couples are denied under DOMA.  See id. at 2695 (majority opinion). 
30.  See id. at 2695. (“DOMA divests married same-sex couples of the duties and 
responsibilities that are an essential part of married life and that they in most cases would be 
honored to accept were DOMA not in force.”). 
31.  Lex loci celebrationis definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/lex%20loci%20celebrationis (last visited Sept. 8, 
2013) (“[T]he law of the place where a contract, esp. of marriage is made.”).  Literally 
meaning the law of the place of the ceremony.  See id.  The Oxford Reference defines this 
phrase as “[t]he law of the place of celebration of marriage.”  Lex loci celebrationis definition, 
OXFORD  REFERENCE, 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100103412 (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2013).   
32.  Literally, the place of domicile. 
33.  An example under this scenario would be a Texas couple flying to New York, 
waiting the requisite twenty-four hour period under New York law, and then obtaining a 
lawful marriage under New York state law. 
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move to another state where such marriages are not recognized.34  These two 
scenarios are factually distinguishable and may—but should not—result in 
distinct legal holdings.  The reason that these scenarios are legally 
indistinguishable is that the benefits at stake are based on federal, rather than 
state, citizenship.  Read fairly, Windsor extends federal benefits to legally 
married same-sex couples. 
Reviewing courts should adopt the lex loci celebrationis approach to 
awarding federal marriage benefits for all purposes.  In fact, the federal 
government already adopts the lex loci celebrationis approach for other 
marriages that were legal where conducted, such as common law marriages or 
varying age and consanguinity restrictions.35  Further, early interpretive 
pronouncements from varying federal agencies such as the Department of 
Defense, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Internal Revenue 
Service are all unequivocally adopting the lex loci celebrationis approach for 
determining which marriages qualify for federal benefits.  If the marriage was 
legal where celebrated, same-sex couples will receive federal benefits.  Well, at 
least from these federal agencies.  Further, though these federal agency 
articulations are critical, they appear as secure—or fleeting—as the next 
presidential administration.  Nothing prevents a change in policy or 
interpretation.  The marriage recognition issue should ultimately be determined 
by an Article III Court rather than through agency interpretations.  The marriage 
recognition issue is not one of policy but, rather, one of constitutional 
magnitude. 
While scholars and legislators may strive to differentiate between Windsor 
in its pure state—only permitting the federal government to recognize same-sex 
marriages where the marriage is both conducted in a state, or country, that 
permits same-sex marriage and the couple continues to reside in a state that 
recognizes same-sex marriage—and the more generic question of which 
marriages should be federally recognized, the factual distinctions should not 
impact the legal outcome. 
It is notable that the marriage in Windsor was performed in Canada, a 
country that permits same-sex marriage, and the couple resided in New York, a 
state that recognizes same-sex marriage.  In the most literal sense, Windsor 
involved a destination wedding for the couple who, when they were initially 
wedded, were required to leave the country to find acceptance for their union.  
Only because New York, their home state, later acceded to their view of same-
sex marriage does Windsor become an easy case—legal at the time of marriage 
and legal in the place of domicile. 
Windsor’s tone, though not its intentionally cautious language, suggests 
 
34.  An example under this scenario would be a New York couple marrying in New 
York while legally domiciled in New York, only to be transferred for work or family purposes 
to Texas. 
35.  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691 (observing that the marital age of consent varies 
among the states—the minimum age is thirteen in New Hampshire versus sixteen in 
Vermont).  Windsor also speaks about the oft-mocked right to marry one’s cousin, available in 
most states.  See id. 
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there should not be tiers of marriages for federal law purposes.36  The flip side 
of the Windsor coin, this author believes, is the exact same currency.  Federal 
benefits should be based on federal law.37  In other words, the federal 
interpretation of marriage benefits should be determined under the lex loci 
celebrationis concept.  That is the current state of affairs for opposite-sex 
marriages, regardless of whether the marriage is legal in the place of 
domicile.38  If destination weddings are federally recognized for opposite-sex 
couples that travel to Toronto, Canada, or New York City to marry, then the 
same federal consideration should be given to same-sex couples who make the 
exact same journey.  Anything less would appear to be a violation under 
Windsor’s governing principles, including the Fifth Amendment’s implicit 
equal protection guarantee.39 
The application of federal law, as it applies to marital benefits and burdens, 
does not interfere in any meaningful fashion with state sovereignty.40  Legal 
concepts repeatedly note that American citizens live under notions of dual 
sovereignty and dual citizenship—both state and federal.  The two forms of 
citizenship are, in fact, legally distinct.  Take, for example, income taxes and 
criminal law.  One can live in Oklahoma, a state mandating state income taxes, 
and be liable for both federal and state income taxes.  When that individual 
moves to Texas, he or she cannot avoid paying federal income taxes just 
because their new home state, Texas, does not recognize state income taxes.  
Likewise, if an individual commits a death-eligible crime in Massachusetts, a 
state without the death penalty, the federal government still reserves the right to 
bring federal charges—including charges that carry the death penalty—without 
infringing on the state’s sovereign right to choose its own criminal penalty 
system.41 
Surely marriage is not drastically different than taxes or criminal law under 
the dual sovereignty doctrine.  When it comes to federally recognizing 
marriage, the federal government can most assuredly have a different standard 
than each individual state—just like income taxes and criminal penalties.42  In 
 
36.  See id. at 2693–94. 
37.  See id. at 2693.  “DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual tradition of 
recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to deprive same-sex 
couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with the federal recognition of their 
marriages.”  Id. 
38.  See, e.g., Obergefell v. Kasich, 1:13-CV-00501, slip op. at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 
2013) (“[I]t is absolutely clear that under Ohio law . . . the validity of an opposite-sex 
marriage is to be determined by whether it complies with the law of the jurisdiction where it 
was celebrated.”). 
39.  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (acknowledging that DOMA’s purpose was to 
ignore more liberal state laws embracing same-sex unions, ensuring “those unions will be 
treated as second-class marriages for purposes of federal law”) (emphasis added). 
40.  See id.  As Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion notes, “DOMA writes inequality 
into the entire United States Code,” impacting well over 1,000 federal marital benefits.  Id. at 
2694.  
41.  See, e.g., United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). 
42.  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690 (“[W]hen the Federal Government acts in the 
exercise of its own proper authority, it has a wide choice of the mechanisms and means to 
adopt.”). 
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numerous ways American citizens have separate responsibilities to their state 
and federal governments.  This is to be expected with dual sovereigns.  But, 
what the Fifth Amendment prohibits, and rightfully so, is any distinction in 
receipt of federal benefits based on state residency or state law.43  National 
citizenship must confer the same federal benefits for all legally married 
persons.44  Otherwise, there will be vacillating tiers of national citizenship 
based, ironically, on state residency.  Such incongruity runs afoul of both logic 
and law.  Such incongruity should be unconstitutional.45 
Further, extending federal marital benefits to the Texas couple traveling to 
New York should not be dependent on the gender of the couple or spouses.  
Were there to be such fluctuation in the receipt of federal benefits, another 
possible violation would occur under the constitutionally-recognized right to 
travel46—opposite-sex couples can partake in a destination wedding and still 
receive federal benefits but same-sex couples cannot partake in such destination 
weddings.47  There appears no rational basis for federally drawing the line at a 
state’s border.48  If DOMA’s federal definition of marriage is unconstitutional 
for legally married citizens in New York, then so too must that definition be 
unconstitutional for American citizens living in Texas or Oklahoma. 
To tread down a different path where the receipt of federal marital benefits 
depends on one’s state residency, though possible, would result in the very 
chaos and vast expenditures that Justice Kennedy sought to avoid by extending 
prudential consideration to the procedural issues in Windsor.49  And, one 
should not lightly forget that Richard and Mildred Loving themselves partook 
of a “destination wedding,” purposefully leaving Virginia for a more hospitable 
venue in the District of Columbia.  Fortunately for them, and all racial 
minorities, the Supreme Court issued a much more forceful recognition of their 
union when the question first came before the Court.  Same-sex couples must 
wait a bit longer for their full inclusion. 
In the final analysis, Windsor, but not its companion case Perry, is a case 
about federal power, federal benefits, and federal law.50  Thus, the Supreme 
 
43.  See id. at 2694.  “Among the over 1,000 statutes and numerous federal regulations 
that DOMA controls are laws pertaining to Social Security, housing, taxes, criminal sanctions, 
copyright, and veterans’ benefits.”  Id. 
44.  See id.  “DOMA undermines both the public and private significance of state-
sanctioned same-sex marriages; for it tells those couples, and all the world, that their 
otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal recognition.”  Id. (emphasis added).   
45.  See id. at 2695.  The Court’s own language offers instruction for the next step in 
marriage equality: “The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
contains within it the prohibition against denying to any person the equal protection of the 
laws.”  Id. 
46.  See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–31 (1969). 
47.  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696.  “DOMA instructs all federal officials . . . that 
[one type of] marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others.”  Id.  Such language 
appears to be the natural predicate for equal federal treatment of all legal marriages performed 
in an individual state. 
48.  See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 637–38. 
49.  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687. 
50.  See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (addressing whether 
Proposition 8, a California state amendment, violated the Fourteenth Amendment due process 
7
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Court was well within its discretion to legally determine which marriages 
qualify for federal benefits under federal law.  And, while Justice Scalia and 
Alito properly criticize Justice Kennedy and the majority’s untethered 
opinion51—is this an equal protection case or a substantive due process 
case?52—the more pressing and enduring concern is which marriages are 
federally recognized.  How will the federal government resolve the destination 
wedding question?  Or, the relocation question?  And, how long before we have 
a case which provides a definitive answer to either or both questions?  Justice 
Scalia forecasts one year.53  For those couples whose legal status regarding 
their marriage remains in flux, even that may seem too long.  We have but one 
federal government.  And, under that one federal government, all legal 
marriages should be treated the same.  Perhaps same-sex couples finally have 
something to lex loci celebrationis. 
 
 
and equal protection clauses which prohibit discrimination under state law).   
51.  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2711–20 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
52.  See id.  Justice Alito fairly suggests that, “[p]erhaps because they cannot show that 
same-sex marriage is a fundamental right under our Constitution, Windsor and the United 
States couch their arguments in equal protection terms.”  Id. at 2716.  But, ultimately, the 
Court’s majority fails to resolve this question or clearly express on what basis the decision is 
being rendered. 
53.  See id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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